managementscienceУправленческие науки / Management SciencesManagement Sciences2304-022X2618-9941Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation10.26794/2404-022X-2020-10-1-22-35managementscience-247Research ArticleТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА УПРАВЛЕНИЯTHEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENTУправление экономическими обменами на выставочном двустороннем рынкеEconomic Exchanges Management in the Exhibition Bilateral Markethttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8171-3787СимоновК. В.SimonovK. V.

Кирилл Вячеславович Симонов — кандидат экономических наук, МВА, доцент кафедры маркетинга экономического факультета

Kirill V. Simonov — Cand. Sci. (Econ.), МВА, Associate Professor of Marketing Department, Faculty of Economics

kirill.simonov.msu@yandex.ruМГУ имени М. В. ЛомоносоваРоссияLomonosov Moscow State UniversityRussian Federation2020220420201012235Copyright © Симонов К.В., 20202020Симонов К.В.Simonov K.V.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://managementscience.fa.ru/jour/article/view/247

Замедление развития российской экономики вызвало падение спроса на услуги экспобизнеса. Компании-организаторы, оперирующие на сегменте торгово-промышленных выставок, столкнулись со снижением интенсивности экономических обменов вследствие оттока клиентов. Статья посвящена модификации управления обменами с целью интенсификации последних. Методология исследования основана на положениях теории двусторонних рынков и теории управления, маркетинга, логистики, методах анализа и синтеза, а также на опыте выставочной деятельности. В результате исследования: обоснована целесообразность применения линейными компаниями — организаторами бизнес-модели двустороннего рынка; дана трактовка обусловленной двухкомпонентностью функциональной двухступенчатости бизнес-модели, когда в рамках линейного фрагмента подготавливается платформа (услуга), а затем включается основной фрагмент — двусторонний рынок, обеспечивающий управление интенсификацией обменов при посредстве асимметричной стратегии ценообразования и сетевых эффектов. Сформулированы рекомендации практикам, озадаченным проблемой интенсификации экономических обменов. Совокупность этих теоретически и практически значимых результатов развивает теорию выставочных двусторонних рынков, а также предоставляет в формате рекомендаций и описания инструментария научную поддержку, помогающую практикам экспобизнеса справиться с проблемой управления экономическими обменами.

The slowdown in Russian economy caused a drop in demand for exhibition business services. Operating in the segment of trade fairs organizing companies faced a decrease in the intensity of economic exchanges due to the outflow of customers. The paper considers modification of the exchange management in order to intensify the latter. The research methodology bases the provisions of the theory of bilateral markets, theories of management, marketing and logistics, methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as on the experience of exhibition activities. As a result of the study: the expediency of application by linear companies-organizers of the business model “two-sided market” was justified; the interpretation of business model determined by two-component functional two-stage system was given when the platform (service) is prepared within the linear fragment and then the main fragment turns on — two-sided market, providing intensification of exchanges management by means of asymmetric pricing strategies and network effects. Recommendations are formulated for practitioners who are puzzled by the problem of economic exchanges intensification. The combination of these theoretically and practically significant results develops the theory of two-sided exhibition markets, as well as provides scientific support in the format of recommendations and descriptions of tools that help exhibition business practitioners cope with the problem of managing economic exchanges.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.